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Abstract
Recently, a quantum key exchange protocol has been described [6], which
served as basis for securing an actual bank transaction by means of quan-
tum cryptography [8]. Here we show, that the authentication scheme
applied is insecure in the sense that an attacker can provoke a situation
where initiator and responder of a key exchange end up with different
keys. Moreover, it may happen that an attacker can decrypt a part of the
plaintext protected with the derived encryption key.
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1 Introduction
In April 2004, in Vienna an actual bank transfer was protected by means of a
one-time-pad-based encryption [8] where the one-time-pad has been derived by
means of a quantum key exchange using a novel authentication scheme. How-
ever, as pointed out, e. g., by Raub et al. [7], using the “textbook version” of a
one-time-pad for encrypting a bank transfer is not a suitable choice, if the plain-
text involves no further integrity protection: assume, for instance, the amount
of money to be transferred is represented as an ASCII string which is XORed
with the one-time-pad. Then, by just flipping certain bits in the ciphertext,
an attacker may change the amount of money to be transferred. Similarly, the
attacker may be able to change the name of the recipient of the money. Thus,
the one-time-pad encryption should be combined with (unconditionally secure)
means ensuring the authenticity of the plaintext [7]. However, even a scheme
modified in this sense would not provide a secure bank transfer:
In this contribution we describe an attack on the quantum key exchange
scheme itself that has been used in the Vienna experiment. Due to a flaw in
the classical authentication part, an attacker may gain access to a part of the
plaintext later encrypted under an established key. Also she may provoke a
situation where the participants of the key exchange end up with different keys
without noticing this. Of course, a trivial denial-of-service-attack (“cutting
all wires”) may also prevent the users from establishing a shared key; but the
attack presented here is more severe in the sense that both protocol participants
obtain a key which they might bring to use, as—differing from the “cut the wires
approach”—the failure of the key exchange remains undetected.
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2 The quantum key exchange scheme used in
Vienna
The published version of the quantum key exchange protocol does not describe
all details of the Vienna experiment. However, for describing our attack this
is not really necessary, and it is sufficient to look at the (classical) privacy
amplification and authentication part. Owing to the attacks described below,
the published version of these parts of the protocol [5] deviates from the version
used in the Vienna experiment; from the latter at the time of writing only a
poster presentation [4] was available to us, and we are indebted to Momtchil Peev
for kindly providing us with further details [3]. In summary, for establishing a
common key between Alice and Bob, the following steps are performed:
• A raw key between Alice and Bob is established by means of polarization-
entangled photons.
• In a sifting step, parts of the raw key are discarded based on a public
discussion between Alice and Bob.
• Next, the quantum bit error rate is estimated based upon which the pro-
tocol is either aborted or continued with an error correction step.
• Hereafter, privacy amplification is performed, based on a matrix sent from
Alice to Bob. The result of the privacy amplification is the final key, if
the subsequent authentication step succeeds.
• Finally, a protocol-log extract is formed from the messages sent through-
out the protocol so far; the authenticity of this log is checked by means
of a message authentication procedure. The final key from the privacy
amplification phase is accepted if and only if this authentication check
succeeds.
As already indicated above, for our attack only the last two steps are of impor-
tance, as only one variant of our attack interferes with the quantum part of the
protocol.
Privacy amplification This part of quantum key exchange protocols has
been introduced by Bennett et al. [1] and is based on a binary rectangular
matrix PA with random entries. Multiplying PA with the raw key yields the
shorter final key about which the adversary has only negligible information.
Thus, each row of PA determines one bit of the final key.
Protocol-log extract The protocol-log extract is comprised of five parts (and
has to be identical for Alice and Bob) [3]:
• the basis for each sifted bit;
• the positions of the bits disclosed in the process of error estimation;
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• the estimated error rate;
• the positions of the bits corrected by the specific error correction routine;
• the last 128 bits of the jointly generated key (these are subsequently dis-
carded).
Note that the only part of the protocol-log extract influenced by the privacy
amplification matrix are the last 128 bits of the jointly generated key; the privacy
amplification matrix itself is not explicitly included, and the attack described
in the next section exploits this.
3 Cryptanalysis of the scheme
By construction of the protocol, only 128 rows of the privacy amplification
matrix PA affect the protocol-log transcript. The remaining rows of PA remain
unauthenticated and hence can be modified by the attacker at will. E. g., she
can
• replace all (but the last 128) rows of PA by random vectors. Consequently,
the receiver Bob of PA will end up with a key different from Alice’s, but
neither Alice nor Bob is aware of this fact. In particular, later bringing
this key to use may result in the failure of an application—even when the
attacker is not interfering with that application;
• flip an individual entry in the i-th row of PA. Then with a success prob-
ability of ca. 0.5 (namely, if the corresponding bit in the raw key is set)
she can flip the i-th bit of the key derived by Bob.
Now suppose that the attacker succeeds in measuring a small number of qubits—
logarithmic in the total number of qubits sent—and assume further that few
qubits of the sifted key after error correction are known to the attacker (this
happens with polynomial probability). Then the attacker may proceed as fol-
lows: She replaces one row of the privacy amplification matrix with a binary
vector containing ones only at positions corresponding to bits of the sifted and
error-corrected key she knows. In this way she learns a bit of the final key
derived by Bob. Consequently, if the key later is used to encrypt a message
from Bob to Alice by a bit-wise XOR, then the attacker immediately learns
the respective plaintext bit. In fact, in the proposed form of the key exchange
protocol, the attacker may use a trivial method for learning the complete key
derived by Bob: even replacing—up to the last 128—all rows of the privacy am-
plification matrix by zero vectors remains undetected and results in the all-zero
key for Bob.
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4 Including the privacy amplification matrix in-
to the protocol-log extract
From the above discussion it may be tempting to conclude that including the
complete privacy amplification matrix into the protocol-log extract is sufficient
for securing the protocol. However, to show that this approach does not offer
acceptable cryptographic security let us consider a variant of the above protocol
in which the complete matrix PA is included in the protocol-log extract and
authenticated. (We stress that this variant of the protocol has not been proposed
or used for the Vienna experiment [6]).
Let us recall the authentication procedure applied in the Vienna experi-
ment: For authenticating the protocol-log extract M , first it is compressed by
a publically known cryptographic hash function H0 like SHA-256, and for all
subsequent computations M is identified with its hash value under H0. How-
ever, in the presence of an unlimited adversary such an identification does not
rule out the following attack:
• The attacker impersonates Bob and follows the quantum key exchange
up to the point where Alice sends the authenticated hash H0(MA) of her
protocol-log extractMA. Here the attacker aborts the protocol with Alice.
• Now, the attacker impersonates Alice and initiates a quantum key ex-
change with Bob. The attacker follows the protocol up to the point where
the privacy amplification matrix PA is to be chosen.
• Instead of choosing a random PA, she makes an exhaustive search over all
possible matrices of the appropriate size to find a matrix P ′
A
which, when
included in the protocol-log extract, yields the same hash value H0(MA)
as obtained from Alice. Such a P ′
A
exists with overwhelming probability, if
we modelH0(·) as a random oracle. As there are significantly more degrees
of freemdom in the privacy amplification matrix than in the typical output
of a a cryptographic hash function (like, e. g., SHA-256), the existence of
such a P ′
A
is plausible.
For actually performing this exhaustive search, the attacker exploits that
up to the last 128 bits of the final key (which only depend on the data
collected so far and the privacy amplification matrix), the protocol-log
extract is completely known.
• The privacy amplification matrix P ′
A
along with the authenticated hash
H0(MA) obtained from Alice are sent to Bob, who will accept this as a
valid authentication.
• The subsequent authentication information from Bob is ignored, and the
attacker can impersonate Alice in the subsequent use of the final key.
To avoid the above attacks and ensure that the privacy amplification matrix is
identical for Alice and Bob, Peev et al. [5] make use of a scheme of Gilbert and
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Hamrick [2] where the privacy amplification matrix is not sent over the public
channel but derived from previously authenticated data.
5 Conclusions
The above discussion shows that in the original form the quantum key exchange
scheme used in the Vienna protocol [4, 6] does not offer acceptable cryptographic
security. Similarly as the “malleability problem” pointed out by Raub et al. [7],
our attacks focus on the classical parts of the protocol and provide evidence of
the importance of classical cryptographic aspects in quantum cryptography.
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